How institutional design fuels conflict in fragile states like Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea
How institutional design fuels conflict in fragile states like Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea
How institutional design fuels conflict in fragile states like Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea
A new study explores how institutional design affects cooperation, competition, and conflict in fragile states. The research focuses on Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 and Papua New Guinea since 1975. Both countries show how formal structures interact with informal networks to shape governance outcomes. In Afghanistan, the post-2001 political settlement led to overlapping mandates and institutional duplication. Public offices were often filled through political bargaining rather than merit, causing frequent leadership changes and weak administration. Efforts to build a merit-based bureaucracy struggled against deep distrust among political actors and a history of centralised rule.
In Papua New Guinea, decentralisation created multiple government layers with unclear responsibilities. This blurred accountability, slowed service delivery, and weakened coordination. The country’s Westminster-style institutions clashed with local traditions like *wantokism* and ‘big-man’ politics, where personal loyalty often outweighed formal rules. Both nations saw patronage and clientelism dominate institutional dynamics. In Afghanistan, these networks undermined stability by fostering competition within fragile state structures. In Papua New Guinea, they encouraged cooperation within political factions but limited broader collaboration. Informal ties—kinship, loyalty, and personal connections—often held more sway than official regulations.
The findings highlight how institutional design can either reduce or deepen instability. Overlapping mandates, patronage, and weak coordination have hindered governance in both countries. Formal reforms must account for the influence of informal networks to improve cooperation and reduce conflict.